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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, PROFESSOR ROSENBLUM,
AND THE HIGHER CRITICISM
RAOUL BERGER*
Professor Victor Rosenblum's review' of my Executive Privilege:
A Constitutional Myth,' is an exercise in straddling which befogs the
issue. At one and the same time he pays tribute to the "vitality and
timelessness of Berger's contribution '3 and accepts United States v.
Nixon4 without blinking, delicately circling the fact that Berger's "myth"
charge is utterly incompatible with Chief Justice Burger's discovery
that a privilege for confidential communications is "inextricably root-
ed in separation of powers." 5 On Burger's premise Berger's "timeless
contribution" falls in shards. Not a word about the salvo of criticism
that greeted the Burger opinion,6 though one might expect that a re-
viewer would welcome the opportunity to weigh that criticism against
the book and the opinion.
Goethe, we are told, "demands from the artist, above all, profes-
sional reliability."'7 It is even more crucial to scholarship; and a critic
who would sit in judgment must be equally reliable. His encomiums
notwithstanding, Rosenblum devotes the bulk of his pages to dispar-
agement: Berger "pounds, mashes, grinds . . . those . . . who have
had the temerity to proclaim that executive privilege is not alien to the
Constitution"; he "disputes allegedly conclusive 'precedents' of execu-
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4. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
5. Id. at 708.
6. See Symposium: United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1 (1974).
7. 3 A. HAUsER, THE SocIAL HiSTORY OF ART 129 (Vintage ed.).
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tive privilege," etc., etc.8 In short, Berger writes as "advocate and ad-
versary," 9 and by implication his scholarship is not to be trusted. The
scientific community has "one simple and devastating criterion, 'Is it
true?' "10 Of the "precedents" Rosenblum himself states that "[i]n pierc-
ing the fatuous pretensions of proponents of absolutism, Berger has
no peer. His verbal scythes cut away the multiple cover-ups presidents
have developed to justify suppression of information."' ' If that be
true, 12 it is of no moment whether I write as "advocate and adver-
sary"; what matters is that I have proved my case.
Serious criticism demands that a reviewer come to grips with the
central thesis of the writer. Nowhere does Rosenblum pause to ap-
praise that thesis: namely, that the pre-1789 history knows no such
doctrine as executive privilege, and there is reason to believe that the
Framers did not mean to create it. Such an appraisal is called for if
only because of the magnitude of the problem. An impeccable "non-
adversary" scholar, Professor Archibald Cox, recently wrote that
"[tihe central problem today is how to deal with governmental se-
crecy and-to be blunt-with governmental deception. A congres-
sional power to inquire, freely exercised, could help to provide the
necessary information."'13 The citadel of the financial community
came to a similar conclusion. 4 "Secrecy," said Professor Cox,
8. Rosenblum 654. Thus he devotes an entire page of his eight and one half pages
to an ironical restatement of my refutation of Younger. Id. at 655-56.
9. Id. at 653 (an "adversary" who "stop[s] short of compiling an 'enemies list'").
Against this background, his statement that "[diespite the minor irritation evoked by
Berger's yen for gladiatorial garb, Executive Privilege is a remarkably thorough and in-
structive probe of presidential accountability ... ," id. at 654, is not worth a fig.
Rosenblum expresses the hope that "confrontative scholarship should be dimin-
ished," id. at 660, and cites as an example of "nonadversary scholarship that augur[s]
a new scholastic attitude. . . D. Frohnmayer, An Essay on Executive Privilege," winner
of the ABA annual prize competition. Id. at 660 n.22. Frohnmayer's excellent synthesis
leans heavily on my materials and liberally sprinkles citations to my book. Frohnmayer,
An Essay on Executive Privilege, in EssAYs ON ExECUTIvE PRIVMEGE (1974).
10. J. SULLIVAN, Tim LMIrrs OP SCIENCE 174 (1932).
11. Rosenblum 658.
12. Professors Archibald Cox, A. Sofaer, and Garry Wills found my refutation of
the "precedents" "devastating." Cox 1384 n.2; Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARv. L. REV.
281, 288 (1974); Wills, Book Review, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, Book Rev. Sec., at
1, col. 1. For a telling and more recent reduction of these "precedents" see Cox 1396-
1405.
13. Cox 1434. Professor Rosenblum acknowledges that in the 1970's the claims of
privilege had become an "'iron curtain which shut off crucial information from Con-
gress and the people.'" Rosenblum 653 (citation omitted).
14. The "pattern of the past several decades strongly suggests that the theoretical
dangers of govemment-by-fishbowl are greatly outweighed by the actual fact of excessive
secrecy." Wall Street J., Nov. 20, 1974, at 26, col. 2.
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if sanctified by a plausible claim of constitutional privilege, is the
easiest solution to a variety of problems. The claim of privilege is a
useful way of hiding inefficiency, maladministration, breach of trust or
corruption, and also a variety of potentially controversial executive
practices not authorized by Congress.' 5
That such practices have increasingly permeated the Executive
branch I showed back in 1965.16 Given the dimensions of executive
secrecy, of its threat to our democratic society, it is of the utmost im-
portance to establish whether or not the claimed privilege has any
constitutional footing. Rosenblum's review obscures and beclouds my
demonstration that it has none.
It will help the reader to have before him a compact summary of
the historical data which led me to conclude that executive privilege
has no constitutional warrant. Looking to the parliamentary practice
at the adoption of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held in' 1927
that "the power of inquiry. . . was regarded and employed as a nec-
essary and appropriate attribute" of the legislative power and was
conferred on Congress.17  Parliamentary records disclose that inquiry
covered the entire spectrum of executive conduct.' In the 1742 Par-
liament the great William Pitt summarized the practice: "We are called
the Grand Inquest of the Nation, and as such it is our Duty to inquire
into every Step of publick Management. . .in order to see that noth-
ing has been done amiss . . ",.9 With one explicable exception in
1742,20 I found no executive refusal to turn over information between
1621 and 1742. In 1701, Charles Davenant stated that "no one has
ever questioned the legislative authority 'to enquire into, and correct
the Errors and Abuses committed'" by those who exercised executive
power.2 ' That was confirmed 130 years later by the English historian,
15. Cox 1433.
16. See generally Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry (pts. 1 & 2),
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1044, 1287 (1965).
17. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927); see id. at 161.
18. BERGER 15-3 1.
19. 13 R. CHANDLER, HISTORY AND PROCEEDiNGS OF PARLiAMENT FROM 1621 TO THE
PRESENT 172-73 (1743), quoted in BERGER 29.
20. John Scropes, Secretary of the Treasury, refused to reveal Secret Service ex-
penses. Parliament was stymied because Scropes, who was eighty years old, said he was
perfectly willing to spend -his remaining months in the Tower, and because he was indis-
pensable to the operation of the Treasury and could not be spared for incarceration.
A more dispensable official was jailed for refusing to discuss the same expenditures.
BERGER 28-29, 170.
21. Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs. The Original
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 558
(1974), quoting C. DAVENANT, ESSAYS UPON I. THu BALLANCE OF PowER. II. THE RInHT
OF MAKiNG WAR, PEAcE, AND ALLiANcEs. IIl. UNx ERsAL MoNARcHY 207-08 (1701).
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Henry Hallam.22 How is this affected by the separation of powers?
Not at all.
In quick summary, here is the historical proof:
1) Montesquieu, the Founders' oracle on the separation of powers,
said that the legislature "has a right, and ought to have the means of
examining in what manner its laws have been executed," in which the
English, he added, enjoyed an advantage over some governments
where public officers "gave no account of their administration. '23 2)
James Wilson extolled the House of Commons, the Grand Inquest of
the Nation, because it "checked the progress of arbitrary power ....
The proudest ministers of the proudest monarchs . . . have appear-
ed at the bar of the house to give an account of their conduct . "..."24
3) References to the House as the "Grand Inquest of the Nation"
are sprinkled through the records of the several Conventions; 25 but in
no case was protest made that this power was too broad or had to be
curtailed for the protection of the Executive. The reason, I consider, is
that in the Revolutionary period, to borrow from Bernard Bailyn,
"faith ran high that a better world. . . could be built where authority
was distrusted and held in constant scrutiny."2 6 4) Given the recog-
nized English practice, we may say with Chief Justice Marshall, "[i]t
would . . . be expected that an opinion which is to overrule all former
precedents, and to establish a principle never before recognized,
should be expressed in plain and explicit terms."2" 5) Confirmation
of the foregoing analysis is furnished by the Act of July 31, 1789,
which imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury "the duty . . . to
. . . give information [to Congress] . . . respecting all matters
. . . which shall appertain to his office."' 8 Are we to conclude that this
Act, drafted by Hamilton, co-author of The Federalist, enacted by
the First Congress in which sat numerous Framers and Ratifiers,
signed by President Washington, who had presided over the Conven-
22. 3 H. HALLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL HISToRY OF ENGLAND 143 (1908).
23. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIIT OF THm LAWS 187 (Philadelphia 1802).
24. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 731 (McCloskey ed. 1967).
25. See BERGER 35.
26. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONsTrrUtoN 319 (1967). This
is confirmed by James Wilson's statement in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention:
'The executive power is better to be trusted when it has no screen .... [The president
cannot] hide either his negligence or inattention." 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF TE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (J. Elliot ed.
1836).
27. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (No. 14,693) (C.C. Va. 1807). See
also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
28. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66.
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tion, violated the separation of powers? There are still other confirma-
tory materials, but let these serve.
No mention of these historical facts is made by Rosenblum. A
serious scholar is under a duty to take account of what at the very
least is "discrepant" evidence;29 indeed Professors Philip Kurland and
Paul Mishkin chided the Court for its failure to do so." To the fore-
going summary may be added a significant contribution to analysis by
Professor William Van Alstyne. Starting from the fact that Article I
lacks an equivalent to the necessary-and-proper clause of Article I, he
states:
It would appear to be plain from this provision that insofar as some
larger zone of executive privilege might by Congress be deemed appro-
priate and expedient for the President to have, more generous by far
than what a court would regard as a minimal privilege indispensable
to the performance of the President's express constitutional powers (e.g.,
a privilege of confidentiality respecting specific troop locations during a
time of military emergency as an indispensable incident of his express
power as Commander in Chief), 81 the necessary-and-power clause per-
mits Congress to provide for that more generous zone of privilege. But
precisely because -the Constitution expressly commits all such questions
of executive convenience and expediency solely to Congress and leaves
nothing to inference or implication from the silence of article II, there
is no room left for any court to analogize any broadly implied power of
executive privilege from article II itself. 32
Apparently Rosenblum considers that United States v. Nixon,83
to which he devotes two and one half of his eight and one half pages, 4
forecloses further debate on the constitutional roots of executive
29. H. BurErn mLD, GEORGE M AND THE IsTORINs 225 (rev. ed. 1959).
30. "In the face of strong, if not conclusive, evidence that 'executive privilege' is
a 'myth,' as Professor Berger has asserted, the Court simply assumed its existence." Kur-
land, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 68, 74
(1974) (citation omitted). 'TIhe substantial body of scholarly learning on the subject,
which includes careful historical and analytic treatments, is not considered or refuted,
but simply ignored." Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United
States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 76, 83-84 (1974) (citation omitted).
31. For me, the historical records teach that the Commander in Chief is merely
"first General," see BERGER 63, and that the deployment of troops is under congressional
control, id. at 111-16. Congress is the senior partner in war-making and it is difficult
for me to conceive that the President is constitutionally empowered to withhold from
Congress information as to troop deployments, particularly since George Washington
was kept on a tight rein by the Continental Congress. Id. at 62.
32. Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon,
22 U.C.L.AL. Rnv. 116, 118-19 (1974).




privilege. But what he swallows whole noted scholars have subjected
to raking fire. For example, Professor Paul Mishkin stated that the
Court's "major pronouncements are essentially ex cathedra, its analysis
of the major issues simplistic, and its doctrines supported far more
by the fiat of the Justices' commissions than by the weight of either
learning or reasoning."3' 5 Chief Justice Burger's statement that presi-
dential privilege for confidential communications is "inextricably
rooted" in the separation of powers 8 0 -a view that is without judicial
precedent-recalls his own remark on a similar occasion. According
to Professor Leonard Levy, the Chief Justice "reported that one of the
Supreme Court Justices had said in a seminar that the presumption of
innocence is 'rooted in the Constitution' and commented, 'Well, it
may be rooted there, but you cannot find it there.' ,,3 7  Seasoned Court
watchers consider that the opinion was stitched together in order to
present the intransigent Mr. Nixon with a unanimous decision that
even he would recognize as "definite,"38 that some of -the "privilege"
remarks may not survive the occasion." In the words of Professor
Cox, "The future may accept them or discard them as assumptions
wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case,40 and what is worse,
as ipse dixits that have no historical foundation." 41
Rosenblum calls on me to deal with "the 'interdependence' di-
mension of separation of powers stressed by Chief Justice Burger."4
35. Mishkin, supra note 30, at 76. See also Kurland, supra note 30, at 73-74. Pro-
fessor Cox states, "The very few directly pertinent statements by members of the Con-
stitutional Convention assert the absence of any presidential privilege." Cox 1391.
"Neither the express privilege to keep the journal secret, nor the express grant of im-
munity from arrest ... applies to the President. If any inference is to be drawn, it
is that the President is to have no privilege." Id. at 1395 (citations omitted).
36. 418 U.S. at 708.
37. L. Lnv, AaAnrS THs LAW 18 (1974).
38. Mishkin, supra note 30, at 86-89; Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 122-23. In
"Behind the marble, beneath the robes," N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, § 6 (Magazine),
at 15, Nina Totenberg, on the basis of "information gleaned from scores of interviews
with Supreme Court clerks, friends of the Justices ... and the Justices themselves," id.
at 15 col. 4, recounts of United States v. Nixon, that "when Burger circulated his first
opinion draft, it met with a wholly negative response .... By a process of erosion
[the other Justices] finally got Burger to incorporate their language. The section that
Burger is reported to have held to most strenuously and successfully, acknowledges for
the first time that there is a presumption of executive privilege in the Constitution."
Id. at 67, col. 1-2.
39. Kurland, supra note 30, at 74.
40. Cox 1418-19.
41. Id. at 1435; see Kurland, supra note 30, at 73-74; Mishkin, supra note 30, at




The Chief Justice invoked Justice Jackson's dictum in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:4 3
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. 44
"Reciprocity," however, is not the same as forcible entry. In "rooting"
a presidential privilege for "confidential communications" in the sep-
aration of powers, Chief Justice Burger derived it "from the suprema-
cy of each branch" within its own sphere, and related it "to the effec-
tive discharge" of executive power.45 On these premises the privilege
should be inviolable.
But Chief Justice Burger proceeded to tear a breach in that in-
violability in order to prevent the privilege from impairing the courts'
"fair administration of . . .justice" in a criminal case.46 That, how-
ever, was not Jackson's course. Notwithstanding his "workable gov-
ernment" dictum, both Justice Jackson and the Court rejected Presi-
dent Trumans seizure of the steel mills on the ground that it ran
counter to the implicit policy of Congress.417 In other words, the needs
of a "workable government' did not sanction a presidential invasion
of the powers of Congress. Undeniably the Constitution "blended"
certain powers. But it does not follow that the Court has a roving
commission to do additional blending in the interests of a "workable
government." On the contrary, Chief Justice Taft held that the
"branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not
expressly blended, and the Constitution should be expounded to
blend them no more than it affirmatively requires. 48  In this he
merely restated what Madison had more forcefully expressed. 49  This
43. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
44. 418 U.S. at 707, quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion).
45. 418 U.S. at 708, 705, 711.
46. Id. at 711-13.
47. Justice Jackson stated that the seizure was unwarranted because Congress "has
covered the twilight zone] by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure."
343 U.S. at 639.
48. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
49. In his discussion of "blending" in TnE FEDERALISr No. 48, at 321 (Mod. Lib.
1937), Madison stated:
It is equally evident, that neither of [the departments] ought to possess, di-
rectly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the adninistra-
tion of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of en-
croaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing
the limits assigned to it.
And he emphasized the need "to provide some practical security for each, against the
Vol. 1975:921]
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is only one of the constitutional problems that arise from and call for
a reexamination of Chief Justice Burger's assumptions.50
When Rosenblum cites the Court's "acknowledgment . .. that
there can be 'an absolute, unqualified . . . immunity from judicial
process' under some or even many circumstances,' ' presumably he re-
fers to the unfortunate credence it lent to an earlier dictum in United
States v. Reynolds,52 a private litigant case, a dictum that excluded even
in camera inspection given a "claim of need to protect military, diplo-
matic or sensitive national security secrets."'5 3 Professor William Van
Alstyne commented, "The reiteration from Reynolds was unnecessary
... . Ironically, it may even imply that Mr. Nixon would have pre-
vailed in the case had he once again incanted the magical words 'national
security.' ,,54 Better guidance is furnished by another statement in Rey-
nolds: "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdi-
cated to the caprice of executive officers."55 For throughout the gov-
ernment, the bureaucracy has an incurable infatuation with secrecy.
Throughout I separated the constitutional from the practical ar-
guments; first I demonstrated that executive privilege has no constitu-
tional warrant; then I went on to show that it should also be rejected on
invasion of the others." In the words of Judge Learned Hand, judicial review "should
be confined to occasions when the statute or order was outside the grant of power to
the grantee, and should not include a review of how the power has been exercised." It
is important, he stressed, "that within its prescribed borders each 'Department' ... shall
be free from interference." L. hAND, Tan BILL OF RIGHTS 31, 66 (1962). See also
The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878).
50. These and other problems are discussed in Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to
Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv. - (1975); Berger, The Incarnation of Execu-
tive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 4 (1974).
Denial of demonstrably relevant evidence in reliance on doctor-patient, lawyer-
client privileges might equally be deemed to "cut deeply into the guarantee of due proc-
ess of law," 418 U.S. at 712, yet these privileges have been left untouched. A strange
spectacle: judicial constructs stand higher than a privilege said to be "rooted" in the
Constitution. See Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses But the Presidency
Largely Prevails, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 40, 43-44 (1974); Kurland, supra note 30, at 73-
74.
51. Rosenblum 659.
52. 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
53. 418 U.S. at 706, 710-11.
54. Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 118. He also states, 'Not since Chief Justice
Vinson's opinion in United States v. Reynolds, which drew a sharp dissent by Justices
Jackson, Frankfurter, and Black, had the Court issued an oblique invitation to the Presi-
dent to throttle judicial review by presenting a claim of executive privilege in the cello-
phane wrapper of 'national security."' Id. at 117. See also Berger, Incarnation, supra
note 50, at 26-28; Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARv. L. REV. 13,
32-34 (1974).
55. 345 U.S. at 9-10.
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practical grounds. Under Rosenblum's hands this goes through a
remarkable transformation:
Legal norms may be generated by courts out of social or administrative
practices, but judicial alchemy has not progressed (regressed may be
better) to the point where transmutation of practices into legal norms is
performed spontaneously. 50
So fancy a notion never entered my mind. Rather, I began with estab-
blished "legal norms" by showing a long-standing, untrammeled power
of legislative inquiry and an absence of executive objections to such
inquiries or to their scope. Only then did I go on to demonstrate that
the claim should also be denied on practical grounds."7 The "alche-
my" is Rosenblum's, not mine.
Similar intellectual confusion is exhibited by Rosenblum's cita-
tion of my remark that the "time and place of a Normandy invasion
and the like, should not be revealed to a litigant,"' as evidence that I
am "no longer dismissing [executive privilege] as a myth."59 No liti-
gant is given a right to executive information by the Constitution;0 it
is a judicial construct designed to facilitate judicial administration.
My concern was with the constitutional right of Congress to obtain
executive information. Recognition that a private litigant has no con-
stitutional right to be informed of the Normandy invasion manifestly
constitutes no abandonment of my view that executive claims of con-
stitutional power to deny information to Congress are unfounded.
Striking an attitude of elder statesmanship, Professor Rosen-
blum states:
With termination of the blatancy and flatulence of presidential
"stonewalling" and with -the avowal of openness and candor by Presi-
dent Ford, hope now abounds that there will be no necessity for further
cases to confront executive intransigence. 61
Alas, Rosenblum is being betrayed by events. On March 7, 1975, it
was reported that Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Se-
56. Rosenblum 655.
57. Senator Sam J. Ervin suggested that the Executive ought not to disclose "raw
and unevaluated evidence," Hearings on Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Infor-
mation by the Executive Before the Senate Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 440 (1971). I would join his suggestion, "not on the basis of a constitu-
tional right to withhold or because executive moral superiority better qualifies [the
Executive] to judge," but as a matter of grace. BERGER 296; cf. text accompanying notes
31-32 supra.
58. Rosenblum 657, quoting BERGER 369 (emphasis added).
59. Rosenblum 657.
60. I put to one side cases where the government bases a hurtful determination upon




lect Committee on Intelligence, called upon President Ford to facili-
tate transmittal of information by federal agencies to the Committee.
Mr. Ford made no commitments, and according to Senator
Church,
Mr. Ford did not rule out the possibility that he might invoke "execu-
tive privilege" and order the withholding of some material and witnesses.
He may have been influenced by a warning he is said to have received
orally from Mr. Colby [head of Central Intelligence Agency] that the
investigation could bring out highly embarrassing matters ....
Here is an investigation into noisome practices that have shocked the
American people and that call for exposure in the interest of thor-
ough-going reform, and once again we are told that disclosure may
prove "embarrassing." Once again executive privilege may be invoked
to shield rank misdeeds. We dare not depend on the grace of a given
President but must view secrecy as an occupational disease of the bu-
reaucracy which infects all who come in contact with it.
Rosenblum also calls on me to formulate "guidelines and exam-
ples for Congress and the judiciary to follow in differentiating privi-
leged from nonprivileged situations." 63 So far as regards congression-
al demands for information, my study convinced me that there are no
constitutionally "privileged" situations. The Nixon criterion was the
need in a judicial case for information in the interest of -the "fair ad-
ministration of criminal justice."64 How real the need for information
is necessarily a matter for case to case evaluation. The needs of Con-
gress stand on a higher level than the needs of an individual accused
of crime. Whether the public interest at stake be in the impeachment
of a high officer or in congressional investigations such as Watergate
and Teapot Dome under the congressional "oversight" power, Con-
gress too can maintain that a claim of privilege cannot be permitted to
"impair" its functions.0 3 Who is to be the judge of such impairment?
In a forthcoming article, I conclude that except on the issues of juris-
diction and relevance to the inquiry, the decision is for Congress."6
Recent developments have led Professor Archibald Cox to conclude
that it is
62. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 3; cf. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975,
§ 4, at 4, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, March 10, 1975, at 49, col. 2.
63. Rosenblum 658-59. Some of such questions I have treated elsewhere; see note
50 supra.
64. 418 U.S. at 711-13.
65. See Berger, Incarnation, supra note 50, at 9-10; Cox 1436-38; Henkin, supra
note 50, at 43.
66. Berger, Congressional Subpoenas, supra note 50.
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desirable to put the force of law behind some congressional subpoenas
addressed to the President, his aides or other executive officials. Ideally,
I think, the legislative right should prevail in every case in which either
the Senate or House of Representatives votes to override the Executive's
objections,
subject to jurisdiction and relevance to the inquiry."
We should not take our leave of Professor Rosenblum without
comment on his "Of special interest to the Northwestern community
is NU alum [sic] Berger's disagreement at one point with Dean Wig-
more." 68  The reference is to Wigmore's citation to a statement by
Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, as to which Berger
said Wigmore "is plainly mistaken."
Says Rosenblum, "Wigmore might, at some point, be fallible
(though no Northwestern grad e'er found him so); Berger's gossamer
analysis of the Burr case, however, hardly provides a foundation for
challenge to the mighty Dean."69  Before turning to my "gossamer
analysis," it is not inappropriate to remark on Rosenblum's embar-
rassing appeal to stuffy parochialism. Northwestern "grads," like all
lawyers, are given to questioning all authority; in the legal lexicon there
are no sacred cows.70
Now for the merits. The dispute, to quote Rosenblum, centers
on
Marshall's sentence, "[i]f it contain matter not essential to the defense,
and the disclosure be unpleasant to the executive, it certainly ought not
to be disclosed." Berger stressed "if" and "not essential to the defense,"
downgrading the significance of "unpleasantness" of the disclosure to
the executive as a coordinate factor in determining privilege. That a
nuance of emphasis in verbal analysis about which reasonable people
might differ would warrant the conclusion that Wigmore was "plainly
mistaken" in his construction requires immersion in the evaluation
world of Alice-in-Wonderland. 71
I should have thought it plain that the negative pregnant is that "if"
"unpleasant" disclosure be "essential to the defense" it "certainly ought
. . . to be disclosed." Were this a doubtful "nuance," several other
statements by Marshall make clear that if the defendant made a strong
67. Cox 1434 (emphasis added).
68. Rosenblum 656.
69. id. at 657.
70. Referring to The Federalist, Chief Justice Marshall said, "No tribute can be paid
to [its authors] which exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the cases
which may arise in the progress of our government, a right to judge of their correctness
must be retained. . . ." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
71. Rosenblum 657 (emphasis added).
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showing of need for a document, "production would be insisted on" not-
withstanding the presidential representation that it was "improper to
exhibit it in public." 72  After his own study of the Burr case, Professor
Paul Freund recently concluded that it established the principle, among
others, that "[u]pon a particularized claim of privilege by the President
the court, giving due respect to the President's judgment, will weigh the
claim against the materiality of the evidence and the need . . . for its
production," and if such need be found, the court will order production. 73
Following in this path, United States v. Nixon held that given the Spe-
cial Prosecutor's need for the "White House tapes," President Nixon
had to deliver them, "confidentiality" notwithstanding.74 These mate-
rials demonstrate that it is Rosenblum who has engaged in "gossamer
analysis."
Since he writes so cosily within the "Northwestern community,"
it may not be amiss to remind him that I borrowed my subtitle "A
Constitutional Myth" from one of the most distinguished NW alumni,
George Ball,75 and that another illustrious alumnus, former Justice
Arthur I. Goldberg wrote, "Professor Berger's book is an honest pres-
entation . . . . On the basis of my own study of this doctrine, I am
in substantial agreement with Professor Berger. ''76
When I entered law practice forty years ago, George Haight, an
eminent Chicago lawyer, told me that what makes a fine lawyer is
"lots of scar tissue." The weight of more scars than Professor Rosen-
blum has yet had time to accumulate impels me to trade sage counsels
with him-more hard-headed analysis and less inflated rhetoric.
72. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191-92 (No. 14, 694) (C.C. Va. 1807);
see BEROER 190-91.
73. Freund, supra note 54, at 31. See also Berger, The President, Congress, and
the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1111-22 (1974).
74. 418 U.S. at 713.
75. Ball referred to "the myth of Executive privilege, and it is indeed a myth, for
I find no constitutional basis for it. . . ." Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 626, quoted in BERGGER
1 n.2.
76. Goldberg, Book Review, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 15, 1974, § F, at 5, col. 3.
[Vol. 1975:921
